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COMMENT
"PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL" IN MARYLAND:
AN ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
In Maryland, it is well settled that the veil of a corporate entity
may be pierced only to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount
equity. This test, formulated to balance the policy of limited
shareholder liability with the interest of serving justice, has produced disparate results. This comment surveys the tests employed by other jurisdictions, reviews and criticizes the policies
and application of the Maryland standard, and advocates the
adoption of a more equitable approach in veil piercing cases - a
"many factors" analysis.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Piercing the corporate veil,! or disregarding the corporate entity, is
a concept with which American courts have struggled for many years.2
A variety of tests have been employed by courts to determine whether a
situation warrants the piercing of the corporate veil. 3 These different
tests have led to a confusion in policy and an inconsistency in results
among the various courtS.4 While many jurisdictions consider a number
1. Piercing the corporate veil is defined as the "judicial process whereby [a] court will
disregard [the] usual immunity of corporate officers or entities from liability for
corporate activities . . . . " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1033 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th
Cir. 1976); G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920); Marr v. Postal
Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940); Carozza v. Federal
Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925). See generally 1 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)
(a general statement of the piercing concept and summary of the varying caselaw);
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 146 (3d ed. 1983) (a concise background of the piercing concept and
summary of the relevant caselaw).
With regard to federal courts, no general federal rule for piercing the corporate
veil has been adopted, primarily because state substantive law applies under choice
of law principles. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a general
discussion of piercing the corporate veil in federal courts, see Comment, Piercing the
Corporate Veil in Federal Courts: Is Circumvention of a Statute Enough?, 13 PAC.
L.J. 1245 (1982); Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under
Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1982).
3. See infra notes 20-86 and accompanying text.
4. An application of the Maryland test in two similar situations demonstrates the inconsistency in results. Compare Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275
Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975) (corporate veil not pierced where assets of one corporation were transferred to other corporations to evade a legal obligation) with Colandrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480 (corporate veil pierced where
assets of one corporation were transferred to other corporations to evade a legal
obligation), cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979).
In both of these cases, the Maryland courts applied the same test for determin-
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of factors in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil,s the Maryland
courts have steadfastly held that a piercing of the corporate veil is warranted only to prevent fraud, or to enforce a "paramount equity."6 This
comment considers the possible inequities resulting under existing Maryland law due to the strict application of these principles. The discussion
begins with an overview of the concept of piercing the corporate veil,
followed by a survey of the various tests espoused in decisional law. After this general background, the comment focuses on Maryland's approach, examining its underlying policies and possible .inequities.
Finally, the comment concludes with a suggested approach for the Maryland courts; an equitable approach that considers many factors in situations where the corporate veil is at issue.

II.

"PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL"-THE CONCEPT

The corporate entity, while generally recognized as being separate
and distinct from its shareholders,7 does not always insulate its shareholders from personal liability. 8 Frequently, a plaintiff or other claimant
will seek to have the corporate entity disregarded and liability imposed
upon the shareholders of the corporation. This circumstance may arise
in situations involving corporations and their individual owners,9 parent
and subsidiary corporations,1O employee-labor union cases, II and even
medicare situations. 12 Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine
available to creditors as well as parties injured by a corporation whose

5.
6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.

12.

ing whether to pierce the corporate veil. The results were different despite the extremely similar fact patterns of the cases. See infra text accompanying notes 125-42.
See infra notes 60-86 and accompanying text.
Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 238, 131 A. 332, 338 (1925)
(first Maryland case to use the term "paramount equity"); see also Starfish Condo.
Ass'n v. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Bart Arconti &
Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975); Dixon v. Process
Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978).
18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 13 (2d ed. 1965); 13A W. FI,.ETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6213 (rev. perm. ed. 1961); 1 H.
OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 10 (1958); F. POWELL, PARENT & SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1 (1931).
18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 14 (2d ed. 1965).
See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th
Cir. 1976); Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967); Weisser v. Mursam Shoe
Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942).
See Starfish Condo. Ass'n v. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805
(1983); Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955);
see also F. POWELL, supra note 7, § 6, at 8-34 (discussion of many characteristics
that are important in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil in the context
of parent/subsidiary corporations). For a discussion of practical arguments relating
to piercing the corporate veil in parent/subsidiary cases, see Posner, The Rights of
Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976).
See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610 (D.
Me. 1977), (piercing analysis used to determine whether a parent corporation is
bound by a subsidiary's union contracts), affd sub nom. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v: T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978).
See United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. & Rehab. Center,
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separate existence they question. The goal is to have the shareholders
held personally liable for either contractual obligations purportedly entered into by the corporation, or for tortious injuries to a plaintiff where
the corporation is alleged to have been the tortfeasor. Where the plaintiff
is able to demonstrate the presence of certain factors 13 with respect to a
particular corporation, the corporate veil may be pierced, but not without hesitancy.
Conflicting policy considerations have made courts hesitant to
pierce the corporate veil. On one hand, there is the strong policy of allowing limited liability for shareholders in order to promote capital
growth and investment. 14 On the other hand, there is the competing interest of serving justice in a particular situation where upholding the theory of limited liability would be inequitable. IS The clash between these
considerations has resulted in the absence of any uniform standards to be
applied in any given case. Accordingly, courts are often inconsistent in
delineating which factors are dispositive when confronted with a veil
piercing case. 16
III. VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS' APPROACHES TO
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Although several theories have been specifically designated, courts
frequently decide the issue of piercing the corporate veil without stating
precisely the theory on which the decision restsP Moreover, where specific theories are mentioned by a court, often the names of the various
theories are used as if they are synonomous. 18 While the names may be

13.
14.

15.

16.
17.

18.

Inc., 511 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1981); United States v. Normandy House Nursing
Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mass. 1977).
See infra text accompanying notes 60-86.
See N. LAlTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 11-12 (2d ed. 1971); Dobbyn, A
Practical Approach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 185,
185 (1971); see also Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 84, 21 S.W. 531,
532 (1893) (forming a corporation invites the investment of capital which encourages trade).
.
See Dobbyn, supra note 14, at 185; see also United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (corporation will be looked upon as a
legal entity unless that entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime).
See infra notes 20-80 and accompanying text.
Rather than specifying a certain theory for determining whether to pierce the corporate veil, many courts have merely listed situations whereby one corporation may
become a mere agent, instrumentality, alter ego, tool, or department of another corporation. See International UAW v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 416 F. Supp. 1267 (D.
Kan. 1976); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.
Ark. 1951); State ex rei. Porterie v. Gulf, Mobile & N. R. Co., 191 La. 163, 184 So.
711 (1938); A.W. Fiur Co. v. Ataka & Co., 71 A.D.2d 370, 422 N.Y.S.2d 419
(1979).
Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 234-38 (2d Cir. 1960) (court used the
term alter ego several times but actually applied the instrumentality theory); National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 255 (W.D. Mo.)
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confusing, it is clear that certain factors must be present regardless of the
theory applied. 19
A.

Agency Theory

According to general principles of agency law, for a principal to be
held liable for the acts of his agent, it must be shown that there was
authority for the agent to act. 20 This authority may arise in three ways:
(1) express;21 (2) implied;22 or (3) apparent. 23
While it is sometimes said that a corporation is merely an agent of
its shareholders,24 if this were true then the shareholders would always
incur liability, providing authority could be shown for the corporation's
acts. This, of course, would frustrate the policy behind the theory of
limited liability,25 and afford no protection to shareholders.
There are, however, cases where corporate owners have been held
liable for the corporation's acts solely based on principles of agency
law. 26 In Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty CO.,27 the court held that
a subsidiary corporation (Darling Stores, Ltd.)' acted as an agent for its
parent corporation (Darling Stores Corp.), an undisclosed principal, in
the negotiation of a lease arrangement. 28 The subsidiary was an assignee
of a lease of property that was owned by the plaintiff, Young Realty
Company.29 The property was then subleased to the parent corporation
by the subsidiary. Subsequently, the lease was abandoned and the plaintiff sued the parent. In imposing liability upon the parent, the court

19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

(court treated instrumentality and alter ego theories as synonomous), affd, 341
F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1964).
With respect to the use of such labels, one commentator asserts that statements
indicating that certain acts make the corporation the shareholder's "alter ego" or
"instrumentality" are meaningless. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L.
REV. 979, 990 (1971).
For a concise review of factors that courts have found sufficient to warrant piercing,
see Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 371, 374-75 (1981).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1957).
/d. § 26 (express authority created where principal expressly gives agent authority
to act through written or spoken words).
/d. (implied authority created where, due to circumstances, agent reasonably believes he has authority to act).
/d. § 27 (apparent authority created where principal makes manifestation to third
party that agent has authority to act).
See Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 576, 230 P. 633, 635 (1924).
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty Co., 121 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1941); Morgan v.
Jackson Ready-Mix Concrete, 247 Miss. 863, 157 So. 2d 772 (1963); c/ Ace Dev.
Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 366-67, 76 A.2d 566, 570 (1950) (court, while refusing to pierce the corporate veil because of the lack of fraud on the defendant's part,
did recognize that agents cannot hide behind the corporate shield when they have
been acting in a conspiracy).
It has been suggested by one commentator that in those cases where the agency
theory is used to pierce the corporate veil, it is actually the instrumentality theory
that the courts are employing. F. POWELL, supra note 7, § 21, at 89.
121 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1941).
/d. at 117.
/d. at 113.
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noted that it is "uniformly held [by Iowa courts] that the corporate entity
of a corporation may be disregarded where it is organized and controlled,
and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality,
agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation."30
The lack of clear delineation between the affairs of the parent and
subsidiary is one circumstance where liability may be imposed under the
agency theory. Another possible basis for liability arises when an individual acting for a subsidiary is also an agent of the parent. 31 In this
situation, an argument may be made that the individual was acting on
behalf of the parent rather than the subsidiary.32 It is therefore important that the individual's status be clearly stated when he acts.
The presence of an agency relationship between a parent and subsidiary corporation does not automatically indicate a basis for piercing the
corporate veil. These agency relationships will be valid so long as necessary distinctions between the parent and subsidiary are preserved. 33 It
has been urged that an application of strict agency principles to piercing
cases would "largely destroy the protection afforded stockholders by
incorporation. "34

B.

Instrumentality Theory

The instrumentality theory3S focuses on the amount of control exercised in a given situation. The following elements trigger liability under
the instrumentality theory: (1) control or complete domination over the
fiscal, policy, and business practices regarding the transaction in question
such that the corporate entity has no separate mind, will, or existence of
its own; (2) use of such control to commit a fraud or other wrong; and
(3) injury or unjust loss proximately caused by the use of such control. 36
Thus, in determining whether one corporation is a ,mere instrumentality
of another, or whether a corporation is a mere instrumentality of a shareholder,37 the element of control is important.
The courts have applied the instrumentality theory primarily in situations where the plaintiff is seeking to hold a parent corporation liable for
the acts of its subsidiary. An application of the instrumentality theory is
found in National Bond Finance Co. v. General Motors Corp.38 In Na30. Id. at 116 (emphasis supplied).
31. Hamilton, supra note 18, at 991-93.
32.Id.
33. /d.
34. F. POWELL, supra note 7, § 22, at 94.
35. Professor Powell was the first to formulate this theory. Id. §§ 5-6.
36. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O. Ry., 247 A.D. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76, ajJ'd, 272
N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936); F. POWELL, supra note 7, § 5.
37. Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (lOth Cir. 1940); Brown v. Magrande Compania
Naviera, S.A., 281 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Va. 1968); Lowendahl v. Baltimore &
O. Ry., 247 A.D. 144, 158,287 N.Y.S. 62, 76-77, ajJ'd, 272 N.Y. 360,6 N.E.2d 56
(1936).
38. 238 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
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tional Bond, the plaintiff sought damages from General Motors (G.M.)
for transactions involving the purchase of conditional sales contracts for
the sale of motor vehicles. 39 These sales contracts were entered into by
the plaintiff with the Lincoln Park Buick Company (Lincoln Park), a
G.M. dealership. The plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil of Lincoln Park, and impose liability upon G.M. based on the following "control" factors: (1) G.M. controlled all the voting stock of Lincoln Park;
(2) Lincoln Park's Board of Directors was controlled by G.M.; (3) G.M.,
through its Motors Holding Division, provided the initial capital for Lincoln Park; (4) all accounting procedures used by Lincoln Park were
G.M. procedures; (5) G.M. supervised the liquidation of Lincoln Park;
(6) the minutes of the Lincoln Park Board meetings indicated that they
were dominated by G.M.; and (7) a Board Director, who also served as
President of Lincoln Park, claimed that the Board meetings were controlled by G.M. Board members. 40 Despite these facts, the court found
that the actual existence of the dealership (Lincoln Park) as a separate
entity was maintained. 41 The court held that the elements required by
the instrumentality theory42 were not satisfied,43 notwithstanding the exercise of considerable control by G.M. over Lincoln Park.
Control is not gauged merely by the amount of capital stock owned;
instead, the inquiry is whether there is complete dominion over the financial matters, policies, and business practices of the corporation. 44 Of
course, the control aspect in the context of the instrumentality theory has
little meaning where sole shareholder corporations are involved. In such
situations, there will be complete dominion exerted over the fiscal and
business practices, yet absent unusual circumstances, such control will be
insufficient to pierce the corporate vei1. 45
39. Id. at 249.
40. Id. at 254-55.

41. Id. at 258. There was evidence of separate books and premises, as well as employees. Additionally, Lincoln Park purchased vehicles from G.M., paying cash on delivery. For all intents and purposes, the actual businesses of the two companies
were separate and distinct. There was little intermingling between the two corporations as far as the formal requisites of the corporate entity were concerned. Id. at
254.
42. Id. at 256-58.
43. Id. at 258. The National Bond court explicitly determined that the corporate veil of
Lincoln Park should not be pierced because of the facts of this particular case.
There, plaintiff relied upon the guaranty of Lincoln Park to safeguard its lien upon
certain cars. With regard to this specifically, the court noted that G.M.'s Board of
Directors had no personal knowledge that the plaintiff's liens against Lincoln Park
were not being protected. Because these matters were solely within the administrative functions of Lincoln Park's President, G.M. could not be held liable. Id. The
court did note, however, that because of the degree of control that G.M. generally
exerts over dealerships such as Lincoln Park, situations could arise where piercing
the corporate veil of such dealerships would be appropriate. Id.
44. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O. Ry., 247 A.D. 144, 154,287 N.Y.S. 62, 72-73, affd,
272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
45. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy & Dupuy Developers, Inc., 227 So. 2d 265 (La.
App. 1969). For examples of "unusual circumstances," see Iron City Sand &
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Unusual circumstances, or an element of unfairness, generally must
be present in addition to control to warrant piercing the corporate veil.
As one court stated, "[s]omething more [than control] is needed, such as
fraud, illegality, or wrongdoing which produced the injury or complaint,
otherwise the corporate entity will stand."46

C.

Alter Ego Theory

Closely resembling the instrumentality theory is the alter ego theory.47 While the elements of these theories are slightly different, decisions founded on either theory tend to exhibit one prominent
characteristic: a loss of individuality of the corporation. 48 The elements
of the alter ego theory have been stated as: (1) a unity of interest and
ownership causing the individuality of the corporation to cease; and (2)
allowing the observance of the separate existence would approve a fraud
or promote an injustice. 49 As with the instrumentality theory, the alter
ego theory requires more than a mere showing that one individual or
corporation owns all the stock of another corporation. 50
The alter ego theory was applied in Marr v. Postal Union Life Insurance Co., 51 where the plaintiff trustees claimed that the defendant corporations, Postal Union Life Insurance Company (Insurance) and Postal
Underwriters Incorporated (Underwriters), were "alter egos" of each
other. 52 Underwriters, the corporation that issued a promissory note to
plaintiffs for the sale of hotel property, 53 was a subsidiary of Insurance.
When Underwriters defaulted on the note, and plaintiffs learned of Underwriters's relationship to Insurance, they sought to pierce Underwriters's corporate veil. In applying the alter ego theory, the Marr court held

46.
47.
48.

49.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Gravel Div. v. West Fork Towing Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. W. Va. 1969)
(corporation operated so that it was always insolvent); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn.
563,227 A.2d 552 (1967) (shareholder conducted business in such a way as to cause
confusion between individual and corporate finances).
Brown v. Magrande Compania Naviera, S.A., 281 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Va.
1968).
See N. LATIIN, supra note 14, § 18, at 86-87.
See G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); Fisser v.
International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins.
Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940). The alter ego theory, like the instrumentality theory, has the element of control as its basic characteristic. See infra text
accompanying notes 49-50. For this reason, it also should have no application in
the context of sole shareholder corporations. If applied in those situations, corporate veils of virtually all sole shareholder corporations theoretically would warrant
piercing.
Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940). For
decisions employing the alter ego theory, see Leavard Petroleum Ltd. v. Mene
Grand Oil Co., 415 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1976); Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali E. Dev.
Corp., 421 So. 2d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1963); Chichester v.
Polikowsky, 231 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1955).
40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940).
Id. at 677, 105 P.2d at 653-54.
Id. at 676, 105 P.2d at 652.
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that the circumstances warranted piercing Underwriters's corporate
veil. 54 The court found that the stock of Underwriters had never been
issued, that the Vice-President of Underwriters, who also served on the
Board of Directors, was paid a salary by Insurance, that all active workers promoting the interests of Underwriters were paid employees of Insurance, that Insurance owned the building where both corporations
were located, and that a common PBX board was used for handling the
telephone service for both corporations. 55 Accordingly, the Marr court
concluded that the defendant corporations lacked individuality, and to
recognize the fiction of their separate existences would be tantamount to
approving a fraud or promoting injustice. 56

D.

The "Many Factors" Approach

Unlike the aforementioned theories, the "many factors" approach is
a suggested analysis that has no uniform set of standards. Instead, this
approach proposes the examination of the factors discussed below, and a
weighing of the equities in each case to determine whether to pierce the
corporate veil. 57
Using this type of analysis, courts have eliminated the problem of
confusing the various piercing theories. In this respect, the importance
of the presence of the elements of the "instrumentality" or "alter ego"
theories no longer exists. Likewise, it is insignificant whether a court
labels its rationale for piercing as being derived from either theory. While
under this "many factors" approach there are no clear-cut standards to
be applied, decisional law that has used this approach, without labeling it
as such, suggests certain factors that should be present to impose liability.58 It is unclear which factors are the most important in determining
whether to disregard the corporate entity. Similarly, the number of factors required to be present is also unresolved. In all instances, however,
where courts adopted this equitable approach and pierced the corporate
54. [d. at 680, 105 P.2d at 656.
55. [d. at 677-78, 105 P.2d at 654-55. Additional facts influencing the court's decision
were that Insurance arranged to have $4,100 advanced to Underwriters to consummate the purchase of the hotel property from plaintiffs, that Underwriters agreed to
execute a $90,000 trust deed in favor of Insurance upon the hotel property, and that
the taxes were paid on behalf of Insurance by its president. [d. at 680, 105 P.2d at
656. Concerning the evidence, the court stated:
The foregoing recital of the evidence convinces us that there were here
present all the necessary elements to constitute an alter ego relationship
between two corporations, namely, (I) control of one by the other; (2) that
one was but the mere conduit of the business of the other; (3) that recognition of the separate existence of the Underwriters would sanction a fraud
and permit oppression and injustice.
[d. at 680, 105 P.2d at 656.
56. Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 680, 105 P.2d 649, 656
(1940).
57. This basic idea was proposed by Professor Latty although not named as such. See
E. LAITY, SUBSIDIARIES & AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 191 (1936).
58. See infra notes 60-86 and accompanying text.
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veil,59 at least two of the factors discussed below were present.
Concededly, under a "many factors" analysis, the determination
whether to pierce the corporate veil rests on a subjective analysis by the
court, and as with any other subjective analysis, some inconsistencies in
results may remain. It is suggested, however, that adoption of this approach would go far to eliminate inconsistencies in the application of the
various piercing standards, provided that the factors listed below are
thoroughly analyzed.
1.

The Undercapitalization Factor

Many courts consider the adequacy of the corporation's capitalization to be an important factor in piercing cases. 60 Inadequate capitalization, which may prevent a corporation from meeting its prospective
liabilities, suggests that the corporation's promoters never intended it to
have a separate existence. Where undercapitalization occurs, it seems
logical to pierce the corporate veil. This, however, is not always the case.
Although inadequate capitalization may increase the probability that a
court will pierce the corporate veil, this factor alone is seldom dispositive,61 and problems are inherent in its application.
One problem associated with the undercapitalization factor is differentiating between underlying contract and tort actions. Inadequate or
nominal capitalization should not be a factor in contract cases because
the parties have voluntarily chosen to deal with each other. Absent some
form of misrepresentation or fraud by a corporation, a creditor who voluntarily enters into a contract with the corporation should be treated as
having assumed the risk of the adequacy of the corporation's capitalization. Hence, in contract actions, there is authority for the proposition
that inadequate capitalization alone is not a basis for piercing the corporate veil. 62
Inadequate capitalization in tort actions, however, presents a different situation. Tort actions generally arise from nonconsensual transactions, and as such warrant treatment different from the contract cases.
Because of the nature of tort actions, the argument that the plaintiff or
claimant "assumed the risk" by dealing with a nominally capitalized corporation is without merit. One commentator, noting inadequate capitali59. Some courts have taken this approach without specifically labeling it the "many
factors" approach. See Hollander v. Henry, 186 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 949 (1951); Kingston Dry Dock Co.-v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31
F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929).
60. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th
Cir. 1976); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Stone v.
Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920).
61. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960); Harris v. Curtis, 8
Cal. App. 3d 837,841,87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617-18 (1970).
62. Carlismo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948); Bartle v. Home
Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955).
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tort actions,

[A]n inadequately capitalized corporation in a risky business in
effect transfers the risk of loss to innocent members of the general public. While the corporation need not be capitalized to
ensure that all conceivable liabilities will be discharged, a corporation should be reasonably capitalized in light of the nature
and risks of the business. 63
Two other significant issues arise in the consideration of a corporation's capitalization: first, how to measure the capitalization; and second,
when in time the capitalization is to be measured. With respect to measuring the adequacy of the corporation's capitalization, some courts
merely arrive at a capitalization figure that they consider reasonable. 64
Commentators have suggested that courts should either apply a reasonable man standard,6s or use a comparative analysis of companies in the
same industry.66 In determining when the capitalization of the corporation should be measured, courts have viewed the measurement date at
the time of incorporation,67 as well as later in time when mismanagement
has occurred. 68
2.

The Abuse of Formalities Factor

The abuse of, or failure to maintain, corporate formalities is another
factor that courts consider in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil. 69 The abuse of formalities issue requires analysis in two specific
respects: (1) the observance offormalities between parent and subsidiary
corporations, or between individual shareholders and a corporation; and
(2) whether the underlying action lies in contract or tort.
In situations involving an abuse of formalities between parent and
subsidiary corporations, one or more of the following factors may be
63. Hamilton, supra note 18, at 988; see Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223
N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
64. These courts often determine the amount without stating the basis upon which their
decision rests. E.g., Automatriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792,
306 P.2d 1 (1957) (court merely looked at the numerical figures and without any
discussion, determined the original contribution to capital to be inadequate); Claremont Press Publishing Co. v. Barksdale, 187 Cal. App. 2d 813, 10 Cal. Rptr. 214
(1960) (where a printer advised the defendant that $10,000 of initial capital was
necessary to fund the publication of a newspaper, the court accepted the printer's
advice without question and made no further inquiry).
65. See Symposium on the Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345, 369 (1957).
66. See N. LATIIN, supra note 14, § 15, at 77-78.
67. See G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Hamilton, supra note 18, at 986 ("[i]nadequate capitalization is measured at the time of
the formation of the corporation").
68. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 68586 (4th Cir. 1976) (court discussed both initial and ongoing financial responsibility
as factors for determining whether to pierce the corporate veil).
69. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 989-94.
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present: (1) a commingling of the assets of both corporations; (2) a lack
of stock issuance by one of the corporations; (3) a failure to maintain
separate corporate records; and (4) a failure to hold directors or shareholders meetings for each corporation. 70
The same factors may be present in the context of a corporation and
its single owner. In this situation, the individual owner's funds are often
commingled with the corporation's finances. 7 ! Regardless of whether the
abuse of formalities occurs in the parent/subsidiary context or in the individual shareholder/corporation context, the policy behind the formalities requirement remains constant. Corporate owners should not impair
the interests of other parties by carrying their unity of interests too far. 72
Commentators have suggested that the formalities factor should
yield different results depending upon whether the action is in contract or
tort. 73 In contract actions, the corporate entity should not be disregarded regardless of any abuse of formalities. 74 This position, like the
argument for the undercapitalization factor, is premised on the notion
that when a third party enters into a contract with a corporation or a
corporate owner, he does so voluntarily and at his own risk.7 s Therefore,
in contractual situations where an abuse of formalities is present, the
third party has the ability to determine whether the corporate entity is
separate from its owner, and accordingly should have determined with
whom he dealt.
Where the underlying action lies in tort, however, the plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed the risk 76 of dealing with the corporation. 77
70. See Bernardin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975) (transfer of
funds by one corporation to another without the formalities of a loan, or having
common bank account may be an abuse); Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644,
382 A.2d 893 (the parent and subsidiary corporations had the same directors, the
parent owned all the subsidiary's equipment, no separate board meetings were held,
and the parent hired all of the subsidiary's employees), cert. denied, 282 Md. 731
(1978); see also Hamilton, supra note 18, at 989-94 and cases cited therein (concise
discussion of abuse of formalities).
71. Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Dillman v. Nobles, 351 So. 2d
210 (La. App. 1977); Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295,
340 A.2d 225 (1975).
72. F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW & PRACTICE § 1.10 (1971 & Supp.
1984).
73. See Hamilton, supra note 18, at 983; Note, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 441 (1967); Note, Should Shareholders be Personally
Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
74. Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525, 554.
75. [d.
76. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68
(W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
In its most basic sense, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in
advance, has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a
known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone.
[d. at 480 (emphasis in original).
77. Note, Should Shareholders be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?,
76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1193 (1967).
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The plaintiff has rarely had prior dealings with the corporation-tortfeasor, and usually will not even learn of such abuse of formalities until
well after the injury.
While the suggested distinction between contract and tort actions is
logical, it is one most courts have failed to make,18 Generally, an abuse
of formalities alone is insufficient to warrant piercing the corporate veil,
regardless of the basis for the underlying action. 79
3.

The Control Factor

The determination of control under the "many factors" approach is
much the same as that made under the instrumentality and alter ego
theories. 8o In short, there must be pervasive control exercised by the
shareholders over the corporation. 8! The unity of ownership and interest, and complete domination by the shareholders over the corporation's
finances, policies, and business practices are factors evidencing pervasive
control. 82 As with the presence of undercapitalization and an abuse of
formalities, the presence of control alone is insufficient to warrant a
piercing of the corporate veil.
4.

The Unfairness Factor
In many situations, a basic element of unfairness is present, and is
another factor considered by many courts in determining whether to
pierce the corporate veil. 83 An estoppel situation often arises when a
78. These distinctions have been proposed by commentators rather than by courts. See
Hamilton, supra note 18, at 988; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
79. While the abuse of formalities factor generally can be applied to all corporations, it
is necessary to note at least one situation where this factor should not be used. In
Maryland, a statutory close corporation may be formed pursuant to Title 4 of the
Maryland Annotated Code. Where a statutory close corporation is involved, such
formalities as a board of directors and regular meetings may be eliminated. MD.
CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 4-302, -402 (1975). While the abuse of formalities
factor should not be used in this context, it is important to note that in such situations the need to pierce the corporate veil may be even greater than where no Title 4
election has been made. Where there has been a Title 4 election, and the corporation has elected to eliminate such formalities as meetings and a board of directors, it
is unlikely that a lack of those formalities may lead to the merging of the corporation and its shareholders into one. Although the lack of formalities technically is
not an "abuse" due to the statutory provisions, an innocent third party may easily
be misled into believing that he was dealing with an individual rather than a
corporation.
80. See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
81. See Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964); G.E.J.
Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); Fisser v. International
Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552
(1967).
82. See supra notes 35-56 and accompanying text. The presence of these factors in a
sole shareholder corporation cannot be said to constitute pervasive control, and as
such should not be considered in determining whether to pierce its corporate veil.
83. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687
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corporation or a corporate owner makes a misrepresentation to the detriment ofa third party.84 In such C8Ses, the element ofunfaimess, coupled
with undercapitalization, pervasive control, or an abuse of formalities,
requires piercing the corporate veil because of the obvious inequity in
upholding the corporate owners' limited liability.
Misrepresentations frequently occur in the form of promises or
guarantees made by a controlling shareholder. 8s They also occur where
a third party is led to believe that he is dealing with a particular individual rather than a corporation,86 where the capitalization of a corporation
is misrepresented,87 or where a third party is tricked into dealing with
the corporation. 88
IV.

A.

MARYLAND'S APPROACH TO PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL

Historical Background

In 1831, the concept of piercing the corporate veil was alluded to in
The Bellona Company's Case. 89 In Bellona, the chancellor discussed, in
dictum, the defendant's allegation that the plaintiff lacked corporate capacity.90 Although the claim could not properly be heard in the proceeding to dissolve an injunction,91 the chancellor nevertheless expounded
upon the implications of the defendant's assertions for future reference,
"when the Court shall be called on for its judgment upon such a case. "92
The chancellor stated, in effect, that a corporation composed of many
stockholders could be dissolved if one incorporator obtained possession
(4th Cir. 1976); G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749, 757 (9th Cir.
1962).
84. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th
Cir. 1976); G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962);
Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942).
85. See Dewitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,689
(4th Cir. 1976) (shareholder promised to pay for goods personally if corporation did
not, and supplier relied on his promise); G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311
F.2d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 1962) (parent corporation assured plaintiff that it would
back subsidiary's obligations).
86. Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 430, 308 P.2d 428,430 (1957).
87. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 688-89
(4th Cir. 1976).
88. See Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 345 (2d Cir. 1942).
89. 37 Md. 435 (1831). The Bellona Gunpowder Company of Maryland had obtained
an injunction against the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Company preventing the construction of a road that Bellona claimed would encroach upon its property. In the present proceeding, the defendant railroad company sought to have the
injunction dissolved. Id. at 435.
90. Id. at 439.
91. The plaintiff's lack of corporate capacity was deemed by the chancellor to be a new
matter in avoidance of the plaintiff'S claim since it was not properly responsive to
the bill. Id.
92.Id.

324

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 14

of all the corporation's stock. 93 In such a case, if one acted "under the
disguise of being a body politic, to protect himself from a personal responsibility for his debts,"94 that conduct could constitute fraud. The
implication of Bellona is that the corporate entity may be disregarded in
situations where all of its corporate stock is owned by one person. This,
however, is not the law in Maryland. 95 This theory was cited with approval in only one case after Bellona,96 and was subsequently discredited. 97
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first espoused the requirements
for piercing the corporate veil in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile CO.,98 and these requirements have remained virtually unchanged. The court stated that the corporate entity could be disregarded, and the owners of the capital stock and the corporation treated
as one, "when there is fraud, or some good ground for its action, in furtherance of the ends of justice. "99
In Bethlehem Steel, a foreman for the Raymond Concrete Pile Company was killed by a backward moving train while he was constructing a
railroad trestle. lOO Because the steel company owned nearly all of the
stock of the railroad company,101 the plaintiff sought to impose liability
upon the former. The court found that the two companies actually were
separate organizations despite the ownership of the stock by the steel
company. Further, it reasoned that because there was neither fraud, nor
any attempt to evade the law, the corporate existence would not be
disregarded. 102
As in Bethlehem Steel, much of the early Maryland case law demonstrates unsuccessful attempts by claimants to impose individual liability
upon shareholders when the shareholders owned all, or nearly all, of the
93. Id. The chancellor considered that such conduct might be a fraudulent evasion of

the law. Id. at 439-40.
94. Id. at 440.
95. See infra notes 103-35 and accompanying text.
96. Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co., 65 Md. 428, 5 A. 534 (1886) (dictum) ("In Bellona
. . . the Chancellor says, the ownership by one person of all the stock of a private
corporation aggregate virtually dissolves the corporation. For the time being it certainly does suspend corporate action. . . . " Id. at 434, 5 A. at 537.).
97. Dollar Cleansers & Dyers, Inc. v. McGregor, 163 Md. 105, 161 A. 159 (1932).
We are not prepared to hold under the present state of the law in relation
to corporations that under no circumstances could a corporation, in which
all of the stock was held by one person, make a valid mortgage to that
person. The expressions in Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co., 65 Md. 428, 5 A.
534, which would lead to that conclusion . . . cannot now be accepted. . . .
Id. at 108, 161 A. at 161; see also State v. General Stevedoring Co., 213 F. 51, 77 (D.
Md. 1914) ("The acquirement by a single individual or corporation of all the stock
of another corporation does not suspend the corporate life. ").
98. 141 Md. 67, 118 A. 279 (1922).
99. Id. at 81, 118 A. at 284.
100. Id. at 72, 118 A. at 280.
101. Id. at 81, 118 A. at 284.
102. Id. at 82, 118 A. at 284.
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corporation's capital stock. 103 In all instances, the factor of sole ownership, in the absence of fraud, was insufficient to warrant the disregarding
of the corporate entity. 104
In 1925, the Maryland court of appeals first introduced the term
"paramount equity."105 While maintaining "fraud" as an actionable basis for piercing the corporate veil, the court added this elusive language:
"or to enforce a paramount and superior equity."106

B.

Current Test

It is now well settled in Maryland that the corporate veil will be
pierced only to prevent fraud, or to enforce a "paramount equity."107
The Maryland courts have applied this test whether liability is sought to
be imposed upon an individual shareholder,108 or a parent corporation.109 Likewise, the standards are unyielding whether the underlying
action be in con tract 11 0 or tort. 111
In Starfish Condominium Association v. Yorkridge Service Corp., 112
the most recent Maryland case discussing the issue of piercing the corporate veil, an attempt was made to pierce the corporate veil of a subsidiary
103. See William Danzer & Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 164 Md. 448, 165 A. 463 (1933);
Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925); see also
Cotten v. Tyson, 121 Md. 597, 89 A. 113 (1913) (requirements for disregarding
corporate entity not set forth); Pott & Co. v. Schmucker, 84 Md. 535, 36 A. 592
(1897) (same).
104. William Danzer & Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 164 Md. 448, 16 A. 463 (1933); Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925).
105. Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 238, 131 A. 332, 338 (1925).
106. [d.
107. Starfish Condo. Ass'n v. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693,458 A.2d 805 (1983);
Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975);
Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); Fuller v. Horvath, 42 Md.
App. 671,402 A.2d 134, cert. denied, 286 Md. 748 (1979); Colandrea v. Colandrea,
42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979); Dixon v. Process
Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978); United
Elec. Supply Co. v. Greencastle Gardens Section III Ltd. Partnership, 36 Md. App.
70, 373 A.2d 42 (1977).
108. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. V. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 309-11, 340 A.2d 225,
234-35 (1975); Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 633-34, 270 A.2d 814, 817 (1970);
Ace Dev. Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 366-69,76 A.2d 566, 570-71 (1950); Fuller
v. Horvath, 42 Md. App. 671, 684, 402 A.2d 134, 142, cert. denied, 286 Md. 748
(1979); Colandrea V. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 427-28, 401 A.2d 480, 484, cert.
denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979).
109. See Starfish Condo. Ass'n v. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693, 713, 458 A.2d
805, 816 (1983); Dixon V. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 654-55, 382 A.2d 893,
899, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978).
110. Starfish Condo. Ass'n V. Yorkridge Servo Corp., 295 Md. 693,458 A.2d 805 (1983)
(contract action); Fuller V. Horvath, 42 Md. App. 671,402 A.2d 134 (same), cert.
denied, 286 Md. 748 (1979); Colandrea V. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d
480 (same), cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979).
111. Damazo V. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970) (action for tortious interference); Bethlehem Steel CO. V. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 118 A. 279
(1922) (negligence action).
112. 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 V\83).
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of a federal savings and loan association. 113 The Maryland court of appeals refused to hold the association liable for its subsidiary's obligations,
not only because there was no indication of fraud, but also because there
was no "identification of an equity which require[d] enforcement, and
which [was] paramount to the ordinary expectation of limited liability. . . . "114 It thus appears from Starfish that the policy of upholding
limited liability outweighs the policy of promoting justice in Maryland.
Furthermore, the Starfish court employed the principle of "paramount
equity," yet as in previous decisions, the court never clearly defined the
term. IIS
With respect to the term "paramount equity," the court in Dixon v.
Process Corp., 116 alluded to a definition:
Unless the party against whom the application of the doctrine
is sought has been blameworthy "of some unconscientious, inequitable or fraudulent act of commission or omission upon
which another has relied and been misled to his injury, the doctrine will not be ~pplied."117
An illustration of the court enforcing a "paramount equity" is found
in United Electric Supply Co. v. Greencastle Gardens Section III Ltd.
Partnership.118 In United Electric, the plaintiff corporation United Electric Supply Company (United Electric) was solely owned by one Joe Penovich, who also was president and sole owner of a licensed electric
company. After a third party unlicensed company contracted to do electrical work for Greencastle Gardens, Penovich gave the unlicensed company permission to use his licensed company's name on the electrical
permit to meet county requirements. In return for the use of his company's name, Penovich secured a promise that the unlicensed company
would purchase all necessary supplies from United Electric. 119 The use
of the licensed company's name for the purpose of obtaining a permit
was clearly in violation of a regulatory statute. 120 Ultimately, United
Electric was not paid for the materials it supplied because of work improperly performed by the subterfuge company, and sought to enforce a
mechanics lien against Greencastle Gardens. 121 The court, relying on
113. Id. at 713, 458 A.2d at 816.
114. Id. at 714, 458 A.2d at 816.
115. For opinions in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland has considered the concept
of "paramount equity," but provided no genuine definition, see Bart Arconti &
Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975); Damazo v.
Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); William Danzer & Co. v. Western Md.
Ry., 164 Md. 448, 165 A. 463 (1933); Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149
Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925).
116. 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978).
117. Id. at 658, 382 A.2d at 901 (citations omitted).
118. 36 Md. App. 70, 373 A.2d 42 (1977).
119. Id. at 73, 373 A.2d at 44.
120. /d. at 72:373 A.2d at 44.
121. Id. at 74, 373 A.2d at 45.
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the violation of the regulatory statute as sufficient grounds for piercing
the corporate veil, refused to treat the Penovich owned United Electric as
a separate corporate entity from the Penovich owned licensed electric
company. The court treated the actions of both corporations as if Penovich had been acting as an individual. The corporate entity was ignored in this case because it was "necessary to enforce the public policy
of a regulatory statute."122 Further, the court stated: "Corporate veils
were not intended to provide false fronts as conveyances for pecuniary
gain made from conduct that is statutorily proscribed."123
Not only is it unclear precisely what constitutes a "paramount equity," but determining what constitutes fraud may be equally as difficult.
Most recently, the Maryland court of special appeals defined fraud as "a
scienter tort consisting of the representation of a material fact that is
false, deceptive and injurious."124 In deciding the issue of fraud in piercing cases, the Maryland appellate courts reached different results in Bart
Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc. 125 and Co/andrea v. Co/andrea,126 despite similar fact patterns.
Bart Arconti, decided in 1975 by the Maryland court of appeals, involved a breach of contract action brought by a general contractor
(Ames-Ennis) against a subcontractor (Bart Arconti & Sons). Named as
defendants in the action were Bart Arconti & Sons, its sole shareholders
Bart and George Arconti, and two controlled affiliated corporations, G &
L Construction Company and Atlas Tile and Terraza, Inc. 127 Because of
the contractual dispute, Bart and George Arconti took precautions to
minimize the assets of Bart Arconti & Sons. Specifically, Bart Arconti &
Sons, the most profitable of the three corporations owned by the Arcontis, ceased to operate and was permitted by its owners to become dormant. 128 All business which normally would have been performed by
Bart Arconti & Sons was thereafter directed to and completed by the two
affiliated corporations. Moreover, the assets of Bart Arconti & Sons were
122. [d. at 80 n.5, 373 A.2d at 48 n.5. The court reasoned that Penovich, acting through
his licensed electric company, had "soiled" his hands by making the illegal agreement with the third party unlicensed company. United Electric's claim relied upon
that illegal contract. The court reasoned that Penovich's behavior, if not overtly
fraudulent, "smacked thereof sufficiently," such that his soiled hands were also the
hands of United Electric. United Electric's claim was therefore precluded under the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands. [d. at 80, 373 A.2d at 47.
123. [d. at 80, 373 A.2d at 47. Even though the violation of a statute was enough to
warrant piercing in United Electric, thereby making the determination of fraud unnecessary, it would seem that absent such a violation, the approach would be twotiered: (1) determine if fraud is present; and (2) if fraud is lacking, look to see if
there is the need to enforce a "paramount equity."
124. Fuller v. Horvath, 42 Md. App. 671, 685, 402 A.2d 134, 142, cert. denied, 286 Md.
748 (1979).
125. 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975).
126. 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979).
127. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 303-04, 340 A.2d 225,
230-31 (1975).
128. [d. at 309, 340 A.2d at 233-34.
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transferred to the affiliated corporations. 129
The court also noted that the construction equipment owned by the
three companies was commingled, all three corporations operated out of
the same place of business, the same workmen were shared by each corporation, all the stock of the three corporations was owned by Bart and
George Arconti, certain loans were made to the Arcontis by Bart Arconti & Sons, and certain insurance policies were transferred to the former by the latter. 130 Despite these findings, the court would not pierce
the corporate veil of Bart Arconti & Sons, nor impose liability upon its
individual owners or the affiliated corporations. \31 The trial court, which
had pierced the corporate veil, viewed the diversion of the business and
the commingling of the corporations's assets as merely being an attempt
to evade a legal obligation. 132 In reversing the lower court's decision, the
court of appeals stated that it was "[un]aware of any Maryland case
where, on facts resembling those here, the Court has allowed the corporate identity to be disregarded merely because it wished to prevent an
'evasion of legal obligations,' - absent evidence of fraud or similar
conduct." 133
In Co/andrea v. Co/andrea,134 a corporation, Cortland Realty, Ltd.,
was formed by Dominic and Carmen Colandrea, then husband and wife.
Marital problems arose, and ultimately a divorce agreement was reached
whereby the corporation was sold to Carmen by way of a stock redemption agreement. Pursuant to this agreement, a substantial portion of the
redemption price was evidenced by notes that were to be paid to Dominic
by the corporation in annual installments.135 Three months after the execution of the stock redemption agreement, Carmen incorporated Cortland, Ltd. to divert the residential sales operation from Cortland Realty,
Ltd. - its most profitable component. 136 Sometime later, the name of
Cortland Realty, Ltd. was changed to Carmen Management Company,
Inc. 137 When Dominic failed to receive payment from the corporation,
he brought suit to pierce the corporate veil, and named as defendants
Carmen and the two corporations she had formed after the stock redemption agreement. 138 The complaint alleged that the business and assets of Cortland Realty, Ltd. had been completely transferred to
129. Id. at 304-05, 340 A.2d at 231.
130.Id.
131. Id. at 313-14, 340 A.2d at 236.
132. Id. at 309, 340 A.2d at 234.
133. Id. at 311-12, 340 A.2d at 235. The trial court, in deciding to pierce the corporate
veil, relied exclusively on H. BRUNE, JR., MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW &
PRACTICE § 371 (rev. ed. 1953), which states that a corporate veil can be pierced in
order to prevent evasion of legal obligations. Id. at 434-35.
134. 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979).
135. Id. at 423, 401 A.2d at 482.
136.Id.
137. Id. at 424, 401 A.2d at 482.
138. Id. at 425, 401 A.2d at 483.
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Carmen's two newly formed corporations,139 just as the assets were
transferred in Bart Arconti. In Colandrea, however, the court of special
appeals disregarded the corporate entity and imposed individual liability
upon Carmen Colandrea. l40
The distinction between the two cases appears to be the factual evidence presented. In Colandrea, a legal obligation was undertaken by the
defendant in her capacity as officer/director of the corporation to make
payment to the plaintiff, but, as the court of special appeals found, at the
time this agreement was made, the defendant had no intention of honoring the obligation. 141 Thus, the new corporations, formed specifically to
avoid liability for this agreement, were part of the defendant's fraudulent
scheme. The fraud finding, though sound in Co/andrea, was based upon
the defendant's own admission in a deposition that she had no intention
of repaying the obligation. Had the defendant not disclosed her fraudulent intention, the Co/andrea court may not have made a finding of fraud,
provided the defendant could have demonstrated sound business reasons
for the creation of the corporations. 142 By comparison, the court of appeals in Bart Arconti found no fraud even where events similar to those
in Colandrea were undertaken to evade a legal obligation. Had there
been an admission in Bart A rconti such as the one in Colandrea, the court
139. Id. at 424, 401 A.2d at 482.
140. Id. at 432-33, 401 A.2d at 486-87.

141. Id. The Co/andrea court stated the following requirements for fraud, which must be
satisifed by clear and convincing proof:
(1) a material representation of a party was false, (2) falsity was known to
that party or the misrepresentation was made with such reckless indifference to the truth as to impute knowledge to him, (3) the misrepresentation
was made with the purpose to defraud (scienter), (4) the person justifiably
relied on the misrepresentation, and (5) the person suffered damage directly resulting from the misrepresentation.
Id. at 428, 401 A.2d at 484 (citations omitted).
142. The court stated that normally it would not interfere with a trial court's finding of
"sound corporate reasons." It concluded, however, that there were no sound business reasons for the creation of Cortland, Ltd. and Carmen Management Company,
Inc. Id. at 429, 401 A.2d at 485. Moreover, the court stated:
Regardless of whether there were sound corporate reasons for the creation
of the new corporations. . . we think the trial court clearly erred in failing to consider Mrs. Colandrea's admission in a deposition. . . that at the
time she signed the agreement on behalf of the corporation, she had no
intention of paying the notes.
Id. at 430, 401 A.2d at 485.
From this analysis, it appears that the court could not have determined fraud
without the deposition of Mrs. Colandrea. Absent such a deposition, the basis for
determining fraud would have rested on Mrs. Colandrea's assertion that the "sound
corporate reason" for the creation of the new corporations was due to the filing of a
race discrimination suit against Cortland Realty, Inc. While the court of special
appeals found this statement to be "actionable fraud," id., it conceded that the other
elements of fraud would also have to be demonstrated by "clear and convincing"
proof. Since the court determined that the deposition was far more convincing, it
neglected to make a finding concerning the presence of all elements of fraud with
respect to Mrs. Colandrea's statement about the race discrimination suit constituting a "sound corporate reason." Id.
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might have pierced the corporate veil of Bart Arconti & Sons. Thus,
absent expressed intentions of fraud, it seems unlikely that the Maryland
courts will pierce the corporate veil.
V.

DOCTRINAL REFORM FOR "PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL" IN MARYLAND: A SUGGESTED
APPROACH

The current law in Maryland for determining whether to disregard
the corporate entity is unduly narrow, and oftentimes inequitable. Maryland courts consistently refuse to pierce the corporate veil for anything
less than a "cleat and convincing" showing of fraud. 143 The appellate
decisions appear to consider only the policy concerns behind the theory
of limited liability, while ignoring the policy of serving justice in a particular case. l44 A more equitable approach would place equal emphasis
upon the latter consideration, one which the Maryland courts seem to
have obliterated. The policy of serving justice in a particular case cannot
be preserved under the current test of fraud or "paramount equity" because of the stringent standards for determining fraud, and because of
concomitant obscurities associated with the term "paramount equity."
Accordingly, the standards enunciated by the Maryland courts should be
revamped to take into account the real equities of a given factual
scenario.

A.

Adoption of the "Many Factors" Approach in Maryland

Utilizing the various considerations enumerated in the "many factors" analysis - including factors such as undercapitalization, abuse of
formalities, control, and unfairness - Maryland courts would be able to
provide injured claimants with a remedy that at present is not available.
Although the current Maryland test is stable because it is the accepted
standard, the elimination of its stringent requirements would help advance the policy of promoting justice in a particular case. Moreover, the
adoption of the "many factors" approach would certainly not undermine
the policy behind limited liability.145
Under the "many factors" approach, even in the absence of fraud,
an injured claimant might be entitled to recovery. There may be situations in which the factors of undercapitalization, control, abuse of
formalities, and unfairness are present, yet fraud is not. 146 Ip such situations, it may be equally as equitable to disregard the corporate entity as it
is where fraud occurs. In addition, demonstrating an element of unfair143. See supra note 141.
144. The only other policy consideration mentioned by Maryland courts has been that of
enforcing public policy proscribed by a regulatory statute. See United Elec. Supply
Co. v. Greencastle Gardens Section III Ltd. Partnership, 36 Md. App. 70, 80 n.S,
373 A.2d 42, 47-48 n.S (1977).
14S. See supra notes 14-1S and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
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ness without having to demonstrate the elusive ingredient of enforcing a
"paramount equity," will lead to fewer ambiguities in situations where
the burden of proving fraud is too great, yet where liability should be
imposed in order to serve justice in a particular situation. Regardless of
whether liability is to be imposed upon an individual or upon a parent
corporation, the decision to pierce the corporate veil should proceed
upon a finding of more than one of the mentioned factors, and a balancing of both conflicting policy considerations. 147

B.

Application of the "Many Factors" Analysis to Maryland Decisions

Applying the "many factors" analysis to several Maryland decisions
demonstrates the possibility, if not probability, of different results being
reached under this approach. A brief discussion of three cases where the
court refused to disregard the corporate veil underscores this point.
In Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 148 the Maryland
court of appeals, holding that there was neither fraud present nor a "paramount equity" to be enforced, refused to pierce the corporate veil. Applying the "many factors" analysis to the facts of Bart Arconti, two of the
previously mentioned factors are evident: control and an abuse of formalities. 149 Clearly, pervasive control was exercised by Bart and George
Arconti over the three companies. ISO Bart Arconti & Sons lost its individuality as a separate entity when the owners took steps to transfer its
assets and thus render it dormant. Similarly, all three corporations lost
their individuality with respect to the types of work in which they were
engaged, 15l and as such, should not have been allowed to profit from the
separate entity privilege.
In addition to the pervasive control present in Bart Acconti, the
commingling of the construction equipment and other assets constituted
an abuse of formalities. One dealing with these corporations could easily
be misled into believing that there was no distinction between the three
corporations because Bart Arconti & Sons's assets and business had been
shifted to the two sister corporations. ls2
The same type of shifting of assets occurred in Colandrea v. Colan147. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. The courts should focus on the policy
that seems to be most important in a particular case; to wit, whether limiting liability in a particular circumstance outweighs the policy of "doing justice in a particular
case," and vice versa.
148. 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975).
149. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
150. Bart Arconti, 275 Md. at 304, 340 A.2d at 231. Not only were Bart and George
Arconti the only stockholders of the corporations, but they also controlled the dayto-day management affairs of the businesses.
151. Id. at 304,340 A.2d at 231. Bart Arconti & Sons's specialties were ceramic tile and
masonry construction. G & L Construction Company, a sister corporation, specialized in masonry construction, while Atlas Tile and Terrazo, Inc., the other affiliate,
specialized only in ceramic tile.
152. Concededly, in Bart Arconti there was no such confusion, but this is not to say that
such conduct could not create confusion in another situation.
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drea,ls3 yet there, the court pierced the corporate veil. Apparently, anything short of demonstrating actual fraud by way of an admission 154 will
be insufficient to pierce the corporate veil. In Bart Arconti, there was not
only the presence of control and an abuse of formalities, but also an element of unfairness: the ability of individuals to avoid contractual obligations by maneuvering assets among corporate bodies. This avoidance
tactic, in many respects, was similar to that in Co/andrea. It is the element of unfairness that needs more consideration by the Maryland courts
to promote the policy of doing justice in a particular case. If the unfairness factor, a component in the proposed "many factors" approach, had
been considered in Bart Arconti, Bart Arconti & Sons would not have
been able to avoid its legal obligations to Ames-Ennis, and therefore,
Ames-Ennis would have recovered the damages to which it was entitled.
Following Bart Arconti, the Maryland court of special appeals discussed piercing the corporate veil in Dixon v. Process Corp. ISS The plaintiff in Dixon, alleging a breach of contract, obtained a judgment against
the parent corporation ("PIM") and attempted to obtain a decree that
the parent and subsidiary -corporations were one in the same, so as to
have the judgment collectible from the subsidiary ("TPC").ls6 At all
times, the plaintiff in Dixon believed he was dealing with only one corporation: (1) the directors for the corporations were the same; (2) the stock
of PIM was paid for but not issued; (3) PIM owned all the equipment
that was used by its subsidiary; (4) PIM hired all of its subsidiary's employees, rented their offices, operated their payroll, attended to unemployment matters, and managed its affairs; and (5) separate board
meetings for TPC were never held. 157 These factors indicate the presence
of control and an obvious abuse of formalities.
After reviewing the above facts, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland stated: "We think there was legally sufficient evidence to cast
doubt as to the separate corporate identities of PIM and TPC."IS8 Nonetheless, the Dixon court held that the corporate veil could not be pierced
because there was no showing of fraud or a "paramount equity."ls9 Had
the "many factors" approach been employed, the doubts expressed by
the court could and would have dictated that the corporate veil be
pierced.
The federal court in the district of Maryland has also applied this
153. 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979); see supra text
accompanying notes 116-23.
154. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. at 430, 401 A.2d at 485. In fact, in no Maryland case
found to date has the corporate veil been pierced solely to enforce a "paramount
equity."
155. 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 282 Md. 731 (1978).
156. [d. at 650, 382 A.2d at 897.
157. [d. at 654, 382 A.2d at 899.
158. [d. at 655, 382 A.2d at 900.
159. [d.
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rigid standard,l60 as illustrated by Gordon v. S.S. Vedalin. 161 In Gordon,
an individual, Johnson, purchased a vessel, the S.S. Vedalin. The
purchase was not made in his own name, but rather in the name of a
corporation, Harold's Trading Post, which Johnson solely owned. 162 After Harold's Trading Post defaulted on the payment, an order of resale
was issued. Pursuant to this resale order, the defaulting first purchaser,
Harold's Trading Post, was "responsible for all costs in connection with
the resale, and maintenance of the vessel." 163 When the various expenses
were not paid, the libelants of the vessel brought suit to have the corporate veil of Harold's Trading Post pierced and individual liability imposed upon Johnson. 164 In support of their argument that the veil should
be pierced, the plaintiffs in Gordon relied upon the following: (1) the
corporation was never properly capitalized; (2) there was doubt that corporate formalities, such as the formal issuance of stock and regular corporate meetings, had ever been observed; and (3) the corporation was
initiated to give Johnson a chance to engage in business that he otherwise
could not engage in because of outstanding judgments against him. 165 In
fact, the only indication of Harold's Trading Post's separate existence
was the filing of its articles of incorporation. 166 The district court described the proof of the corporation's separate existence as being "tenuous at best,"167 however, with Maryland law controlling, the court held
that the corporate veil could not be pierced.
Using the "many factors" approach, as opposed to the strict Maryland requirements, the outcome in Gordon most likely would have been
different. The district court's finding of the corporation's tenuous separate existence would have, in all likelihood, yielded a conclusion that
recognizing the separateness would be unfair or inequitable; hence, the
corporate veil would have been pierced. In rendering its decision, however, the Gordon court was confined to the well settled Maryland law,
160. See Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F. Supp. 133 (D. Md. 1982); Gordon v. S.S. Vedalin, 346
F. Supp. 1178 (D. Md. 1972); Winand v. Case, 154 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1957); see
also supra note 2 and accompanying text (law review articles discussing the federal
court's problems with piercing the corporate veil).
161. 346 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Md. 1972).
162. [d. at 1180.
163. [d.
164. [d.
165. [d. at 1181.
166. [d. This apparently is sufficient to determine the corporate existence. This thought
was stated with approval by the Dixon court following Gordon. See Dixon, 38 Md.
App. at 655, 382 A.2d at 900. In Maryland, the acceptance of articles of incorporation by the State Department of Assessments and Taxation conclusively establishes
the existence of the corporation as a legal entity. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE
ANN. §§ 1-205, 2-102(b) (1975).
167. "Even though the proof of the existence of the corporation as a separate entity and
not as the mere alter ego of Harold Johnson is tenuous at best, it seems that, under
Maryland law, the corporate entity cannot be disregarded in this case." Gordon,
346 F. Supp. at 1181.
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and thus unable to pierce the corporate veil. 168
VI. CONCLUSION
Several theories have been formulated through the years to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil. Although these theories have
been given various names by both courts and commentators, certain factors are repeatedly present and analyzed by the courts. Generally, the
presence of these factors, coupled with an element of unfairness, provides
the rationale for a court's decision to pierce the corporate veil.
Maryland also considers these factors, but in a different manner.
Specifically, the presence of certain factors coupled with an element of
unfairness does not justify piercing the corporate veil unless doing so
would prevent fraud or achieve a "paramount equity."
Decisional law applying the rigid Maryland requirements demonstrates that the Maryland courts regard the policy behind limiting liability as being tantamount to the policy of promoting justice in a particular
case. The import of this latter policy concern needs to be reconsidered
by the Maryland courts in piercing cases. It is submitted that a more
equitable approach is needed in Maryland, and that the suggested "many
factors" analysis provides the best alternative. Concededly, limited
shareholder liability should be maintained whenever possible to encourage capital growth and investment, but not to the point that such
maintenance causes a blatent disregard for basic principles of justice and
fairness. Only after the Maryland courts make an honest attempt to balance these policies will equity be achieved in situations involving piercing
the corporate veil.
Denise L. Speer

168. Id.

